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SPORTS AND THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK
DOCTRINE IN NEW YORK
LURA HESS
INTRODUCTION
Sports and athletic competition are an integral aspect of
American life in all its varieties. Beginning in elementary
school, and sometimes prior to, children are introduced to
competitive sports and encouraged to embrace them as an analog
to life and as a means of developing important life skills such as
teamwork and discipline.' For adults, recreational sports and
professional sports are a dominant part of mainstream American
culture, providing much of the commonality that ties together
our disparate and geographically diverse country. 2 But sports
can be risky,3 and injuries are an inherent part of athletic
participation for students, 4  amateurs, recreational, and
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Jan.
1998, Cornell University.
1 Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260 (111. App. Ct. 1975) ("One of the
educational benefits of organized athletic competition to our youth is the
development of discipline and self control.").
2 For example, in the Seattle area, much of the Samoan population gathers
weekly for cricket tournaments accompanied by festivities. The competitions have
grown in size with the community and are said to "bring[] the whole community
together like nothing else." Phuong Cat Le, For Seattle Area's Samoans, Cricket is
the Only Game in Town: A Swinging Sport for the Whole Family, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 18, 2001, at Al. Cricket is also the sport of choice for a group
of men from South Central Los Angeles who formed the Compton Cricket Club and
whose team, the Compton Homes and Popz, recently toured England for a series of
competitions. The group seeks to embrace the disciplined and civilized nature of the
sport as a means of advancing positive social change in their community. See Flavia
Munn, Motto: Ball not Bullet, W. DAILY PRESS, Sept. 3, 2001, at 17.
3 See William Powers, Sports, Assumption of Risk, and the New Restatement, 38
WASHBURN L.J. 771 (1999); see also Carol Christian, Heart Condition, Not Heat,
Killed Football Player, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 21, 2001, at Al (discussing deaths of
high school athletes caused by hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, including two in 2001
and one in 1996, 1995, 1992, and 1991 respectively).
4 See Evan Henderson, Sporting Chances; As More Students Play, Injuries Take
a Greater Toll, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Sept. 17, 2001, at L3 (citing American Academy
of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) statistics finding "that more than 1.4 million
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professional athletes 5 alike. The variety of ways and contexts in
which injuries occur are seemingly limitless and range from
those caused by the physical environment to those caused by the
conduct of co-participants. 6 Not surprisingly, many injured
sports participants press legal claims in seeking to be made
whole for their injuries.7 The apportionment of liability in sports
injury cases is both important and difficult, as the variables
involved in a particular incident may be as numerous as the
contexts in which they occur. Many courts and commentators
have recognized the public interest when apportioning liability
in sports injury cases, so as not to dampen the vigor with which
sports are played, while encouraging conduct that avoids
unnecessary risks and injuries. 8 Although the approaches to
children under age 15 are treated in doctors' offices [for sports related injuries] each
year," and that athletes between the ages of five and twenty-four make 2.6 million
emergency room visits).
5 See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 518 (10th Cir.
1979) (professional football player intentionally struck and injured by another
player during a game); Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 204-06 (N.Y. 1997)
(consolidating actions of three injured sports participants: an Olympic-level
bobsledder who sustained injuries when the bobsled crashed though a wall of the
exit run; an adult karate student injured when a fellow student raised the height of
an obstacle plaintiff was attempting to jump over; and an adult recreational tennis
player who tripped over a torn net on the court of a private tennis club); Benitez v.
New York City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 30 (N.Y. 1989) (high school football
player paralyzed during varsity football game); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 966
(N.Y. 1986) (professional jockey injured during race after his horse collided with
another horse); Rubenstein v. Woodstock Riding Club, 617 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (3d
Dep't 1994) (twelve year old participant in equestrian competition sustained leg
fracture from kick by another participant's horse). More recently, professional
football player Korey Stringer died of heatstroke during pre-season practice. See
Sally Jenkins, Blame Vikings' Weak View of Toughness for Stringer's Death, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at D1.
6 See supra notes 3-5.
7 Stephen D. Sugarman, The Monsanto Lecture: Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U.
L. REV. 833, 876 (1997) ("In recent years courts around the country have been
presented with a great number of sporting injury lawsuits between participants, but
outside the professional sports context.").
s See Daniel E. Wanat, Torts and Sporting Events: Spectator and Participant
Injuries-Using Defendant's Duty to Limit Liability as an Alternative to the Defense
of Primary Implied Assumption of Risk, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 237, 278 (2001) ("When
the Tennessee Court of Appeals and Supreme Court begin to consider the cases
involving ... sports ... they would do well to consider the following question:
Whether and when is it necessary not to impose a duty of care in order to encourage
vigorous participation in the sport?"); see also Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258,
260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) ("This court believes that the law should not place
unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports by our
youth... [but] some of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete
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apportioning liability in sports injury cases varies by
jurisdiction, the assumption of risk doctrine often plays an
important, though differing role. This Note will explore the
analytical framework currently in use by the New York courts
for determining liability in cases involving injured athletes. It
will also briefly review the approaches of other states. It will
then suggest that New York implement an analytical distinction
when apportioning fault in cases involving students compared to
cases involving professional athletes. This distinction will center
on the use of the assumption of risk doctrine as it applies in New
York, which also utilizes the comparative fault scheme in tort
cases. The essence of this Note's proposal is that in light of New
York's application of the comparative fault scheme, the
assumption of risk doctrine should be available as a defense,
complete or otherwise, in the context of professional athletics
only.
I. THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE
The philosophical underpinning of the assumption of risk
doctrine, and particularly its use in sports injury cases, is best
described by the language of Judge Cardozo in the seminal 1929
case Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., Inc. :9
Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a sport
accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious
and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by
his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of
contact with the ball. 10
Judge Cardozo further explained that by choosing to
experience the "flopper," an amusement park ride, the plaintiff,
who had witnessed the ride's effect on the other visitors, "made
his choice to join them. He took the chance of a like fate, with
whatever damages to his body might ensue from such a fall. The
onto the playing field."); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1982) ("Fear of
civil liability... could curtail the proper fervor with which the game should be
played and discourage individual participation .... ); Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 33
("The policy underlying this tort rule is intended to facilitate free and vigorous
participation in athletic activities."); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ohio
1990) ("[Olur goal is to strike a balance between encouraging vigorous and free
participation in recreational or sports activities, while ensuring the safety of the
players.").
9 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929).
10 Id. at 174.
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timorous may stay at home."" The assumption of risk doctrine
can be described as the idea that an individual is barred from
recovery for injuries resulting from an activity in which the
individual realized the risks, implicitly or expressly, and
nevertheless voluntarily participated.
Traditional common law doctrine has distinguished
"express" assumption of risk from "implied" assumption of risk.12
Express assumption of risk resulted from agreement in advance
between the plaintiff and defendant that the defendant need not
use reasonable care towards the plaintiff. Implied assumption of
risk was premised on the plaintiffs willing and knowing
placement of herself in the way of harm created by the
defendant. 13 In recognizing implied assumption of risk as a
separate defense, 14 the Second Restatement of Torts provides:
[A] plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or
his things caused by the defendant's conduct or by the condition
of the defendant's land or chattels, and who nevertheless
voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to permit his things
to enter or remain within the area of that risk, under
circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not
entitled to recover for harm within that risk. 15
With regard to sports, the Restatement provides direct
language pertaining only to spectators, 16 but the principles it
defines would presumably apply to a player who chooses to
participate in a sport in spite of a known risk.17
11 Id.
12 See Arbegast v. Buckeye Donkey Ball Co., 480 N.E.2d 365, 371 (N.Y. 1985)
(noting that express assumption was held to preclude any recovery, and that
implied assumption of risk may require that a plaintiffs consent to the risk involved
be "unreasonable under the circumstances").
13 See id.
14 Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE
L.J. 185, 185 (1968) ("The Second Restatement of Torts states that implied
assumption of risk should be recognized as a separate defense.").
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 C (1965).
16 See id. at illus. 4. This illustration provides:
A, the owner of a baseball park, is under a duty to the entering public to
provide a reasonably sufficient number of screened seats to protect those
who desire it against the risk of being hit by batted balls. A fails to do so.
B, a customer entering the park, is unable to find a screened seat, and
although fully aware of the risk, sits in an unscreened seat. B is struck and
injured by a batted ball. Although A has violated his duty to B, B may be
barred from recovery by his assumption of the risk.
Id.
17 See Powers, supra note 3, at 772.
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The assumption of risk doctrine came into use in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before the advent of
comparative responsibility.18 The assumption of risk doctrine
has proved difficult to integrate into comparative fault schemes
and the results vary by jurisdiction.19 Much debate has occurred
and remains regarding the viability and usefulness of the
assumption of risk doctrine's incorporation into analytical
frameworks that apportion fault on a comparative basis. 20 The
general argument advocating the abandonment of the
assumption of risk doctrine is that comparative fault naturally
encompasses the doctrine; the evaluation of whether a plaintiff
knew and accepted a known risk in an activity is an essential
element of a comparative fault determination. 21 Notably, the
new Restatement rejects all forms of implied assumption of risk,
maintaining only an equivalent of the express assumption of risk
aspect of the doctrine.22
18 See id. at 772-73. "Comparative responsibility" refers to a regime in which
the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to the plaintiffs share of fault. See
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 201, 503-06 (2000).
19 Powers, supra note 3, at 772-73 (noting that after the advent of comparative
fault, most jurisdictions abandoned the assumption of risk doctrine, most often by
instructing juries on comparative fault principles only and including plaintiffs
knowledge or risk as a factor for the jury to consider).
20 See John L. Diamond, Assumption of Risk After Comparative Negligence:
Integrating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 721-24, 749-
50 (1991) (noting that the responses of jurisdictions and commentators to the
inclusion of the assumption of risk defense in comparative faults schemes have been
mixed). The author discusses three major approaches and advocates that "[uin the
absence of an applicable limited duty or a valid contract, the jury should allocate
responsibility through a comparative evaluation of the defendant's and plaintiffs
behavior." Id.; see also Sugarman, supra note 7, at 835 (commenting that the
assumption of risk doctrine should be replaced with various other tort doctrines,
such as "no duty," "no breach," "no cause," "no proximate cause," or comparative
negligence); James, supra note 14, at 185 n.2 (referring to a 1906 article which
posited that implied assumption of risk should not be utilized as a separate defense
and that a plaintiffs unreasonable assumption of risk would constitute contributory
negligence).
21 See Powers, supra note 3, at 772-73.
22 See id. at 775 (explaining that the new Restatement rejects implied
assumption of risk by stating that express assumption of risk does not apply to a
plaintiff who "merely demonstrates that [he] was aware of a risk and voluntarily
confronted it" (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (Proposed Final Draft 1999))). The author adds that "[a]
plaintiffs conduct in the face of a known risk, however, might constitute plaintiffs
negligence and therefore result in a percentage reduction of the plaintiffs recovery."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2
cmt. i (Proposed Final Draft 1999)). This follows the logic of those who have long
20021
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II. NEW YORK'S APPROACH TO SPORTS INJURY CASES
In 1976, New York State replaced its common law rule of
contributory negligence with a scheme of pure comparative
fault.23  The language of the statute refers specifically to
assumption of risk, stating that it shall not bar recovery but
rather requires the plaintiffs culpable behavior to be considered
when determining the amount of the recovery.24 New York
courts have found some exceptions to this rule.25 For example, in
Arbegast v. Board of Education, the Court of Appeals found that
the system of comparative negligence established by C.P.L.R.
section 1411 did not extend to the express assumption of risk by
the injured claimant. 26 Further, in Turcotte v. Fell,27 the same
court held that in the context of sporting events, participants
may incur a "primary" assumption of risk composed of "risks...
incidental to a relationship of free association between the
defendant and the plaintiff," and, "if the risks of the activity are
fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented
to them."28 In such instances, the defendant's duty of care to the
advocated a rejection of the assumption of risk doctrine as a separate defense. As
Professor Powers explained, "Abandoning implied assumption of risk as an
independent defense does not mean that a plaintiffs actual knowledge or voluntary
decision is irrelevant." Id. Rather, the plaintiffs behavior and knowledge of the
danger is considered in the evaluation of his or her culpability. See id.; see also
supra note 19.
23 The statute provides:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the
decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not
bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be
diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to
the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the
damages.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 1997).
24 See id.
25 The four primary situations in which a plaintiffs conduct may be a complete
bar against recovery from defendant are: (1) plaintiffs conduct is the sole cause of
her injuries; (2) plaintiffs injuries are the direct result of her commission of serious
criminal or illegal conduct; (3) express assumption of risk; and (4) primary
assumption of risk. See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, MCKINNEY'S
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED § 1411, 565 (1997).
26 Arbegast v. Rd. of Educ., 480 N.E.2d 365, 366 (N.Y. 1985). The Arbegast
court found that the plaintiff had expressly assumed the risk by participating in a
donkey basketball game after the defendant's employee told plaintiff that she
participated "at her own risk." Id.
27 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986).
28 Id. at 968; see also infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff is eliminated, thereby barring any recovery for the
plaintiff through comparative fault.29 These two exceptions come
into play particularly with regard to claims for injuries caused to
participants in sporting events. 30
Most importantly, in light of the adoption of the comparative
negligence statute, New York courts have cast the assumption of
risk doctrine as "a measure of the defendant's duty of care,"31
rather than an as absolute defense, as it had been under the
contributory negligence scheme. The defendant's duty of care,
however, is intricately related to both the plaintiffs ability to
comprehend and the plaintiffs actual comprehension of the
risks.32 If a risk is not inherent and not otherwise obvious or
assessable by the plaintiff, it will likely be found that the
defendant did not fulfill his or her duty to the plaintiff, and that
the plaintiff did not assume the risk.33
Stated more simply, in the context of the comparative fault
scheme, the assumption of risk doctrine is an evaluation of the
duty of care owed to the plaintiff that includes "considering the
risks plaintiff assumed when he elected to participate in the
29 See Alexander, supra note 25, § 1411, 565.
30 See, e.g., Traficenti v. Moore Catholic High Sch., 724 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (1st
Dep't 2001) (finding that high school cheerleader freely assumed the risk posed by
performing on a hardwood floor because it was "obvious"); Fisher v. Syosset Cent.
Sch. Dist., 694 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (2d Dep't 1999) (holding that high school
cheerleader assumed the risks posed by performing stunts on a bare hardwood
floor); Clark v. Sachem Sch. Dist., 641 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (2d Dep't 1996) (holding
that high school swimmer voluntarily assumed the risk when he dove off starting
blocks into shallow end).
31 Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that because a
bobsled rider and martial arts student assumed the risk of injury, the owners and
operators of the premises were relieved of liability (citing Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at
968)).
32 Defendant's duty of care "is a duty to exercise care to make the conditions as
safe as they appear to be. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or
perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its
duty." Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 968; see also Morgan, 685 N.E.2d at 207-08 ("[A]
participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and
arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such
participation.... [Flor purposes of determining the extent of the threshold duty of
care, knowledge plays a role but inherency is the sine qua non.").
33 See Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 968. As suggested by Professor James regarding
the rejection of the assumption of risk doctrine, perhaps the framing of the doctrine
as an evaluation of duty owed to the plaintiff "reflects a recognition that this
defense is inconsistent with newer policies which underlie the imposition of a duty
to take care of others that extends beyond merely warning them." James, supra note
14, at 192.
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event."34 Therefore, a New York analysis of an injured athlete-
plaintiffs claim includes an assessment of the "skill and
experience of the particular plaintiff' to determine what degree
of risk awareness should be imputed to him or her.35 As the
Court of Appeals has noted, "[Aiwareness of risk is not to be
determined in a vacuum. 3 6 It is not necessary, however, for the
plaintiff to have "foreseen the exact manner in which his or her
injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for
injury of the mechanism from which the injury results."37
A critical aspect of the New York analytical framework for
determining liability in sports injury cases is a lack of distinction
between professional and student athletes. As noted in Maddox
v. City of New York, New York courts, using the identical
rationale for all athletes, simply recognize that "a higher degree
of awareness will be imputed to a professional than to one with
less than professional experience in the particular sport."38
Perhaps the most notable New York case involving a
professional athlete's claim for recovery is Turcotte v. Fell,39
where a famous jockey suffered paralyzing injuries after his
horse clipped the heels of another horse during a race, causing
the jockey to fall.40  The Court of Appeals granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and held that because
the danger was inherent in the sport, Turcotte consented to
relieve the defendant of his legal duty to use reasonable care to
34 Morgan, 685 N.E.2d at 208.
35 Maddox v. City of New York, 487 N.E.2d 553, 556 (N.Y. 1985). This case was
decided before the enactment of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411; nonetheless, the Court of
Appeals has noted that the same result would have been reached under a
comparative negligence analysis. See Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 971.
36 Maddox, 487 N.E.2d at 556.
37 Id. at 557.
38 Id. at 556-57 (finding that professional baseball player's continued
participation in the game despite his knowledge of the wet and muddy conditions in
which he was playing constituted assumption or risk as a matter of law); see
Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 970 (N.Y. 1986) ("[A] professional clearly
understands the usual incidents of competition resulting from carelessness,
particularly those which result from the customarily accepted method of playing the
sport, and accepts them.").
39 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986).
40 Id. at 967. Plaintiff (Turcotte) commenced the action against the co-
participant (Fell), the New York Racing Association, which owned the Belmont Park
racetrack where the accident occurred, and David Reynolds, the owner of the horse
which Fell rode. In his career, Turcotte had ridden in over 22,000 races, achieving
international fame after winning the "Triple Crown" of racing in 1973. Id.
[Vol.76:457
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avoid the incident.41
In another notable case, Benitez v. New York City Board of
Education,42 the Court of Appeals denied recovery on a summary
judgment basis to a high school football player who suffered
paralyzing injuries during an interscholastic varsity game. 43
The injury-causing game was played against a more advanced
team, and the plaintiff had become fatigued and did not inform
his coach. The Benitez court determined that the voluntary
nature of the plaintiffs participation and his experiences in
playing high school football the previous eighteen months
amounted to the plaintiff putting himself "at risk in the
circumstances of this case for the injuries he ultimately
suffered."44 The court emphasized that fatigue and injury were
inherent in competitive sports, particularly football, and that the
injury in this case was a "luckless accident arising from vigorous
voluntary participation in competitive interscholastic
athletics."45 Since Benitez, New York courts have continued to
decide sports injury cases on a summary judgment basis.46
41 Id. at 969-70. The court further determined that a "professional athlete is
more aware of the dangers of the activity, and presumably more willing to accept
them in exchange for a salary, than is an amateur." Id. The court listed the
following factors for determining whether a professional athlete can be held to have
consented to an act or omission of a co-participant:
The ultimate purpose of the game and the method or methods of winning
it; the relationship of defendant's conduct to the game's ultimate purpose,
especially his conduct with respect to rules and customs whose purpose is
to enhance the safety of the participants; and the equipment or animals
involved in the playing of the game.
Id. The Turcotte court found the fact that plaintiff had testified to the dangers of
horse racing and the inability of every jockey to keep the horse under perfect control
to be important. Id.
42 541 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1989).
43 Id. at 30.
4 Id. at 34. The high school for which Benitez played had asked to be placed in
a lower-level league because it felt that players were likely to suffer serious injuries
by playing at the higher level. Id. at 31. The request was denied. In addition, the
school's coach testified that he advised the school's principal to pull the team out of
the particular game in which Benitez's injury occurred because he felt it was unsafe
due to the mismatch in skill level between the two teams. Id. During the game,
Benitez played most of the first half and became fatigued. Id. The court did note,
however, that "a high school athlete, even an outstanding one, does not assume all
the risks of a professional sportsperson." Id. at 33.
45 Id. at 34. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs claim of inherent
compulsion-i.e., his freedom of choice was overcome by the direction of a superior-
by finding that plaintiff presented no evidence that he was~compelled to follow the
coach's directions. Id.
46 See Fisher v. Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist., 694 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2d Dep't 1999);
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The definition of a defendant's duty to a sports participant
who becomes injured is of particular interest and relevance in
the context of scholastic sports because a school owes some duty
to its students at all times . The classic statement of a school's
duty of care to children is found in the 1939 case Hoose v.
Drumm,47 which provides in part, "[A] teacher owes to his
charges to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary
prudence would observe in comparable circumstances." 48
The "parent of ordinary prudence" standard, however, seems
only to apply when students are engaged in compulsory
activities,49 and it has been noted that a school's duties as
gauged by the prudent parent is limited to an extent, because
schools are not to be insurers of their students' safety.50 Further,
in the context of claims for negligent supervision, schools have
been held to a duty to adequately supervise the students in their
Egger v. St. Dominic High Sch., 657 N.Y.S.2d 85 (2d Dep't 1997) (finding that
smaller than regulation-size mat used for high school wrestling practice did not
present unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased risk); Clark v. Sachem
Sch. Dist., 641 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1996); Rubenstein v. Woodstock Riding Club,
617 N.Y.S.2d 603 (3d Dep't 1994) (holding that twelve year old plaintiff assumed the
risk of being injured by a horse when she participated in a horse show). But see In re
Kraszewski v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist., 715 N.Y.S.2d 357 (4th Dep't 2000) (finding
that a triable issue of fact exists whether eight year old participating in pee-wee
wrestling program assumed the risk of injury and whether coaches exercised
reasonable care in providing instruction and supervision).
47 22 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 1939).
48 Id. at 234. This principle has been consistently upheld. See Merson v. Syosset
Cent. Sch. Dist., 730 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dep't 2001); Kennedy v. Waterville Cent.
Sch. Dist., 569 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (4th Dep't 1991); Merkley v. Palmyra-Macedon
Cent. Sch. Dist., 515 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (4th Dep't 1987); Harker v. Rochester City
Sch. Dist., 661 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (4th Dep't 1997) ("Stated another way, a school
district has a 'special relationship to its students ... analogous to that between
carriers and their passengers or innkeepers and their guests.'" (citing Pratt v.
Robinson, 349 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1976))).
49 See Merkley, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (noting that "the injury occurred while the
students were engaged in a required activity"); Kennedy, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 279
(plaintiff was injured in an occupational education shop class where he was "in the
custody and control of [defendant] and [thus, defendant] had a duty to exercise
toward him the same degree of care that a reasonably prudent parent would
exercise under the same circumstances") (citation omitted).
G0 See Lawes v. Bd. of Educ., 213 N.E.2d 667, 668-69 (N.Y. 1965) ("A school is
not liable for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure
another." (citing Hoose v. Drumm, 22 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 1939))); Harker, 661
N.Y.S.2d at 334 ('The duty of a school district to its students 'is strictly limited by
time and space' and exists 'only so long as a student is in its care and custody
during school hours, and terminates when the child has departed form the school's
custody.'" (citing Norton v. Canandaigua City Sch. Dist., 624 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (4th
Dep't 1995))).
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charge and are only liable for those injuries that are foreseeable
and proximately caused by the absence of such supervision. 51
Moreover, when students are engaged in what are deemed to be
"voluntary" activities, such as after school sports programs, the




Besides New York, California is the state with perhaps the
best developed assumption of risk doctrine as used in the
comparative fault context. In the 1992 case Knight v. Jewett,53
the California Supreme Court attempted to clarify and settle
differences among its lower courts regarding the application of
the assumption of risk doctrine, in light of the adoption of
comparative fault principles. 54 In Knight, an adult plaintiff was
injured during a recreational touch football game played among
acquaintances. In evaluating the plaintiffs claim the court
noted that adoption of comparative fault principles had only
51 See Mirand v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994); Oehler v.
Diocese of Buffalo, 716 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (4th Dep't 2000) (citing Foster v. New
Berlin Cent. Sch. Dist., 667 N.Y.S.2d 994 (3d Dep't 1998)).
52 Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 32 (N.Y. 1989) ("In the
context of wholly voluntary participation in intramural, interscholastic and other
school-sponsored extracurricular athletic endeavors, we have required the exercise
of the less demanding ordinary reasonable care standard."). The Benitez court also
stated, with regard to duty, that "a 19-year-old senior star football player and
college scholarship prospect [does not] fall within the extra protected class of those
warranting strict parental duties of supervision." Id.; see also Edelson v. Uniondale
Union Free Sch. Dist., 631 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (2d Dep't 1995) (appellant school
district's duty of care was "limited to exercising ordinary reasonable care in
protecting the plaintiff from unassumed, concealed or unreasonably increased risks"
regarding student voluntarily participating in wrestling match); Traficenti v. Moore,
724 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (1st Dep't 2000) (holding that although plaintiff cheerleader
assumed the risk of injury posed by a bare, wooden gym floor, genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the school breached its supervisory duty); In re
Kraszewski v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist., 715 N.Y.S.2d 357, 357 (4th Dep't 2000)
(refusing to dismiss the case on a summary judgment basis because it found issues
of fact as to the plaintiffs assumption of risk and whether the defendant school
district had exercised reasonable care in providing instruction and supervision to
the pee-wee wrestlers).
53 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
54 Id. at 699-701 (noting that the assumption of risk doctrine has long been a
source of confusion in definition and application because of the myriad of different
factual settings in which it is applied, sports-injury cases being only one scenario).
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partially absorbed the assumption of risk doctrine, and that the
critical aspect of analysis was whether the defendant possessed,
and had breached, a duty of care towards the plaintiff.55 Unlike
New York, the plaintiff's assessment of the risk and
reasonableness in encountering it are not important issues. 56
Once the defendant is found to have breached a duty to the
plaintiff, it is irrelevant for the purpose of recovering damages
whether or not the plaintiff assumed any risk. 57 Nonetheless,
the assumption of risk doctrine will serve as a complete bar to
recovery if the court determines that the defendant owed no duty
of care to the plaintiff.58 The Court of Appeals, in interpreting
Knight, held that the determination of the existence of a duty is
a question of law.59
B. Other States
Not all jurisdictions have formulated assumption of risk
doctrines as distinct as New York and California, particularly
with regard to sports injury cases.60 Even fewer opinions have
5 Id. at 701.
56 See id. at 703. In a previous case, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal.
1975), the court referred to a distinction between instances of "primary" and
"secondary" assumption of risk. Primary assumption of risk refers to the legal
conclusion that there is "no duty" on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff.
Secondary assumption of risk refers to those situations in which the defendant does
owe a duty but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the
defendant's breach of that duty. See id. at 1240-41. The Knight court suggested that
the critical distinction in Li was "not a distinction between instances in which a
plaintiff unreasonably encounters a known risk imposed by defendant's negligence
and instances in which a plaintiff reasonably encounters such a risk." Knight, 834
P.2d at 703; see also Harrold v. Rolling "J" Ranch, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 674 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) ("[T]he inquiry does not begin with the question whether the plaintiff
assumed the risk .... Rather the inquiry begins-and ends-with an analysis of
whether the defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff .... ).
57 See Knight, 834 P.2d at 705 (explaining that while it may be accurate to
suggest that one who voluntarily participates in a risky sport may have consented
to certain risks inherent in the sport, it is unrealistic to suggest that such an
individual consents to a breach of duty by others that increases the risks beyond
what the individual impliedly consented to, even where the individual is aware of
the possibility of misconduct by others).
58 Id. at 708.
59 Staten v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 657, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The
court also stated that whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff is a legal
question that depends on the "nature of the sport or activity in question and on the
parties' general relationship to the activity, and is an issue to be decided by the
court, rather than the jury." Id. (citing Knight, 834 P.2d at 706).
60 See Wanat, supra note 8, at 237 (discussing spectator injuries and the courts'
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been written about students injured in school athletics. The
Washington approach applies concepts similar to those used in
California. In Kirk v. Washington State University,61 the
Washington Supreme Court held that the assumption of risk
doctrine, in light of the adoption of comparative negligence
principles, may not serve as a complete bar to recovery; rather,
the doctrine "may act to limit recovery but only to the extent the
plaintiffs damages resulted from the specific risks known to the
plaintiff and voluntarily encountered."62
In contrast, courts in other states denounce the assumption
of risk doctrine or find other methods of negligence analysis
more useful. 63 For example, Arizona has expressly rejected the
reformulation of assumption of risk as a "no-duty rule"64 in favor
of an analysis of defendant's negligence and the reasonableness
of risk the plaintiff chose to encounter. 65 In Crawn v. Campo,66
treatment of professional and amateur participant injuries). In his discussion, the
author relies on no cases dealing expressly with students injured in school-
sponsored sports (high school age or younger); see also Sugarman, supra note 7, at
834, 847-52.
61 746 P.2d 285, 288-90 (Wash. 1987). The Kirk plaintiff sustained a permanent
elbow injury ater being injured during a college cheerleading practice while
performing a stunt on astroturf. Id. at 287.
62 Id. at 289. The court found Professor Schwartz's articulation compelling:
A rigorous application of implied assumption of risk as an absolute defense
could serve to undermine seriously the general purpose of a comparative
negligence statute.... [Elvery commentator who has addressed himself to
this specific problem has agreed that plaintiff should not have his claim
barred if he has impliedly assumed the risk, but rather that this conduct
should be considered in apportioning damages under the statute.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.5, 180 (2d ed. 1986) (footnotes
omitted), quoted in Kirk, 746 P.2d at 290.
63 See Phi Delta Theta Co. v. Moore, 10 S.W.3d 658 (Tex 1999); Pfister v.
Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. 1995); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio
1990); Estes v. Tripson, 932 P.2d 1364 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Crawn v. Campo, 630
A.2d 368 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975), affd, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994).
64 See Estes, 932 P.2d at 1365-66. Indeed, Arizona has dealt a legislative blow
to the assumption of risk doctrine. As the court noted, "To judicially apply
assumption of risk as a dispositive defense in Arizona would violate article 18,
section 5 of the Arizona Constitution." Id. at 1365. Article 18, section 5 of the
Arizona Constitution provides: "The defense of contributory negligence or of
assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at
all times, be left to the jury." ARIZ. CONST. art. 18, § 5.
65 See Estes, 932 P.2d at 1366-67. The duty owed is to "act reasonably in the
light of foreseeable and unreasonable risks." Id. at 1366 (citing Rogers v. Retrum,
825 P.2d 20, 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). Whether the risk is unreasonable "depends
substantially on the context." Id.
66 630 A.2d 368 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), affd, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994).
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the New Jersey Superior Court noted that the concept of
assumption of risk was "essentially written out of our
jurisprudence." 67 On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
concluded that in the context of "mutual, informal, recreational
sports activity," the standard of liability should be raised to that
of recklessness or intent to harm.68
Similarly, in the older but illustrative case Nabozny v.
Barnhill,69 the Appellate Court of Illinois, as a matter of first
impression, required the type of conduct needed to impute
liability to a player for injuries caused to another player to be
"deliberate, wilful [sic] or with a reckless disregard for the safety
of the other player so as to cause injury to that player, the same
being a question of fact to be decided by a jury."70 The court
viewed itself as creating a carefully drawn rule to control "a new
field of personal injury litigation."71 The Supreme Court of
The case involved injuries to a participant in a "pick-up" softball game caused by a
co-participant. Id. at 369. The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division agreed
with the trial judge's finding that the "great weight of case authority in the various
states," requires proof of reckless or intentional conduct in sports-injury cases. Id. at
370. Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the appellate
division's finding that sports activities should not be granted broad immunity from
tort. See Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 605 (N.J. 1994). It further noted that a
heightened standard of recklessness will better distinguish between unreasonable
and unacceptable conduct and the "risk-laden" conduct inherent in sports, and affix
liability appropriately. Id. at 607.
67 Crawn, 630 A.2d at 372 (citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,
155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959)). The court referred to the dissenting opinion in Knight,
arguing that the assumption of risk doctrine invites analysis of "esoteric terms" and
"abstruse distinctions." Id.; see Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 712-13 (Cal. 1992)
(Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court further used the
facts in Crawn to demonstrate the "emptiness" of the assumption of risk concept,
and noted the simplicity of substituting ordinary negligence terms:
A co-participant who creates only risks that are "normal" or "ordinary" to
the sport acts as a "reasonable [person] of ordinary prudence under the
circumstances." If the co-participant creates an unreasonably great risk, he
is negligent. Assumption of risk does nothing except obfuscate the analysis
by wrongly suggesting that a sports participant can or should be barred
from recovery without regard to ordinary negligence principles.
Crawn, 630 A.2d at 373 (citations omitted).
68 Crawn, 643 A.2d at 605.
69 334 N.E.2d 258 (111. App. Ct. 1975). The facts of the case involved a high
school soccer player kicked in the head by a member of the opposing team. Id. at
260.
70 Id. at 261. The court also stated that a "reckless disregard for the safety of
other players cannot be excused. To engage in such conduct is to create an
intolerable and unreasonable risk of serious injury to other participants." Id.
71 Id.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN SPORTS
Illinois upheld this standard in the more recent case Pfister v.
Shusta72 and noted that the court and legislature have defined
willful and wanton conduct as "a course of action which shows
actual or deliberate intent to harm or which, if the course of
action is not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or
conscious disregard for a person's own safety or the safety or
property of others. 73
Likewise, in determining for the first time the proper
standard for evaluating the duty of persons engaged in a
recreational or sporting activity, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in
Marchetti v. Kalish,74 followed the Illinois Supreme Court's lead
in Nabozny and held that recovery is allowed for injuries caused
as a result of a sports activity only where reckless or intentional
conduct exists.7 5 The Marchetti court expressly stated that the
same standard would be applied regardless of whether the
injury-involving activity was organized or unorganized, involved
children or adults, or was supervised or unsupervised. 76
Interestingly, in 2000, an Ohio Court of Appeal found a gym
teacher immune from suit under state law for failing to require
72 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. 1995) (noting that "[plarticipants in team
sports... assume greater risks of injury than nonparticipants or participants in
noncontact sports"). The court held that "[r]ecovery will be granted for injuries
sustained by participants in contact sports only if the injuries are caused by willful
and wanton or intentional misconduct of co-participants." Id.
73 Id. at 1016 (citing Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1994)).
74 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990).
75 Id. at 703-04. The court elaborated, "[Wihere individuals engage in
recreational or sports activities, they assume the ordinary risks of the activity." Id.
In so holding, the Marchetti court upheld an earlier ruling that there is no liability
for participants in sporting events for behavior falling short of an intentional tort.
See Hanson v. Kynast, 526 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("We believe that a
cause of action does exist in such a situation, but only for an intentional tort, i.e., an
intentionally inflicted injury not arising out of the ongoing conduct of the sport
itself .... ").
76 "Whether the activity is organized, unorganized, supervised or unsupervised
is immaterial to the standard of liability." Marchetti 559 N.E.2d at 702 (citing Keller
v. Mols, 509 N.E.2d 584, 586 (IlM. App. Ct. 1987)). The court also stated, "We find no
basis for imposing a greater duty of care on youths merely because their games have
shifted from the school gymnasium to their homes." Id. (quoting Keller, 509 N.E.2d
at 586). Further, in expressly rejecting the approach adopted by the Restatement,
which utilizes a negligence analysis requiring an evaluation of the plaintiffs "scope
of consent," the court stated, "We believe that requiring courts to delve into the
minds of children to determine whether they understand the rules of the
recreational or sports activity they are engaging in could lead to anomalous results.
In this context, we perceive no reason to distinguish between children and adults."
Id. at 703.
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students to wear protective gear when roller skating in class
unless his acts were made "with malicious purpose, in bad faith,
or with wanton recklessness."77
The Supreme Court of Texas first addressed the issue of tort
liability for injuries resulting during sports activities in 1999.78
Although the majority of the court declined to lay out a rule for
applying the assumption of risk doctrine, Justice Enoch, in his
dissent, discussed at length the posture of the assumption of risk
doctrine in Texas after the adoption of comparative negligence.79
The Justice found clear judicial precedent to hold that voluntary
participation in an activity is no longer a total bar to recovery,
participation in a "risky sports activity" is not to be considered
an express assumption of the risk, and the defense of implied
assumption of risk has been completely absorbed by allocation of
damages through comparative responsibility.8 0 Like the New
York courts, the dissenters found that the issue of duty should
play a role in liability determination.8'
IV. LIABILITY WAIVERS/RELEASES
As a practical matter, the increased use of signed liability
"waivers" or "releases" may have a significant impact on a
school's liability with regard to a particular student-plaintiff.
Often those who seek to participate in school sports find
themselves confronted with the option of either signing a release,
in which they agree to waive their legal rights to recover for any
injuries sustained as a result of involvement in the activity, or
77 See Hughes v. Wadsworth City Sch. Dist., No. 2961-M, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis
1271, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2000).
78 See Phi Delta Theta Co. v. Moore, 10 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. 1999).
79 Id. at 659-60 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 660 (Enoch, J., dissenting). The court here makes no mention of
applying different standards of liability to different situations giving rise to injury,
and refers generally to "sports or recreational participants." Id. (Enoch, J.,
dissenting).
81 Id. at 661 (Enoch, J., dissenting). The dissent set forth the following proposed
rule: "[A] defendant does not owe a duty to protect a participant from risks inherent
in the sport or activity in which the participant has chosen to take part." Id. (Enoch,
J., dissenting). Further, it explained that a defendant cannot owe a duty to protect a
plaintiff from unavoidable risks of the sport, and that the duty determination in
sports cases should, therefore, focus on whether the risk that resulted in the
plaintiffs injury was "inherent in the nature of the sport or activity." If it is found
not to be inherent, the case may proceed on an ordinary negligence theory. Id. at
662 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
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not participating at all.82 The Second Restatement of Contracts
defines a release as "a writing providing that a duty owed to the
maker of the release is discharged immediately or on the
occurrence of a condition."8 3  In general, courts do not look
favorably upon these types of exculpatory agreements.8 4 In what
some commentators have noted to be the seminal case on the
issue of releases in athletics,8 5 the Washington Supreme Court
held that exculpatory agreements releasing public schools from
liability for their negligence in a sports program are void as
against public policy.8 6  In doing so, the Court expressly
82 For example, the language of the disputed release in Zivich v. Mentor Soccer
Club, Inc. provides:
Recognizing the possibility of physical injury associated with soccer and for
the Mentor Soccer Club ... accepting the registrant for its soccer programs
and activities, I hereby release, discharge and/or otherwise indemnify the
Mentor Soccer Club..., its affiliated organizations and sponsors, their
employees, and associated personnel, including owners of the fields and
facilities utilized by the Soccer Club, against any claim by or on behalf of
the registrant as a result of the registrant's participation in the Soccer
Club.
696 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ohio 1998).
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284 (1981). Such agreements are
also known as "exculpatory agreements."
84 See Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal
Liability of Coaches for a Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7,
54 (1996) ("The practical consequence of using such agreements is that they are
frowned upon by both participants and their parents .... [and] are difficult to
enforce."); see also Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1207 (Me. 1979) ("Courts
have traditionally disfavored contractual exclusions of negligence liability and have
exercised a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny when interpreting contractual
language which allegedly exempts a party from liability for his own negligence.").
85 See McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 84, at 56.
86 See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 971-72 (Wash. 1988). The
court utilized the following test, established by the California Supreme Court in
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963), to
determine whether the exculpatory agreement violated public policy:
[T]he attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which
exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It concerns a business
of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party
seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance
to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some
members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform
this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any
member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction,
the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of
bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his
services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the
public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no
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acknowledged that to relieve a defendant of liability in these
situations violates public policy, regardless of whether the
agreements are termed "releases" or "express assumptions of
risk."8 7
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit recently upheld a decision of
the district court and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed
summary judgment dismissal of a paralyzed minor hockey
player's claim against, among others, the sponsoring hockey club
because his parents had each signed a form that contained an
exculpation clause.88 The court found the release to be valid as a
matter of law, and noted the principle of contract law that a
person who signs a contract is held to understand its contents.8 9
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recently
held that the injuries sustained by a racetrack crew pit member
were not recoverable because the plaintiff had previously signed
a liability waiver.90 The Hardy court carefully analyzed the
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and
obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction,
the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the
seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.
Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 971 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-46). The Wagenblast
court also relied on the fact that interscholastic school sports are "part and parcel of
the overall educational scheme in Washington." Id. at 972.
87 Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 974.
88 Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *6
(6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001) (unpublished opinion). The language of the relevant
provision is as follows:
Upon entering events sponsored by USA Hockey and/or its member
districts, I/We agree to abide by the rules of USA Hockey as currently
published. I/We understand and appreciate that participation or
observation of the sport constitutes a risk to me/us of serious injury,
including permanent paralysis or death. I/We voluntarily and knowingly
recognize, accept, and assume this risk and release USA Hockey... from
any liability therefore.
Id. The court found the release to apply to injuries sustained during the training
season, except those caused by the defendants' willful or wanton misconduct. See id.
at *17.
89 See id at *18. ("A person who signs a contract without making a reasonable
effort to know its contents cannot, in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, avoid
the effect of the contract." (quoting Pippin v. M.A. Hauser Enters., Inc., 676 N.E.2d
932, 937 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996))); see also Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696
N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998). The court in Zivich found such liability waivers signed
by parents of minors to in fact be supported by public policy concerns because the
waivers may protect volunteers who coach youth sports and, therefore, may
"promote more active involvement by... families, which, in turn, promotes the
overall quality and safety of these activities." Id.
90 Hardy v. St. Clair, 739 A.2d 368, 370 (Me. 1999). The Agreement at issue
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agreement to determine if the injury-causing event was covered
by its terms and concluded that it was.91 It is unclear from the
decision whether or not the plaintiff was a professional or an
amateur, and the court frequently cited to a case involving a
minor plaintiff who sued a college after sustaining a hockey
injury.92 The implication, therefore, is that the plaintiff's status
and age are relatively unimportant in determining the validity of
liability releases.
There are few significant New York cases on this topic and
seemingly none related to injured student athletes. A recent
case decided by the appellate division, however, found that a
plaintiff injured during the course of a fox hunt assumed the risk
of all injury, evidenced by the fact that she signed a release and
waiver of liability.93 Yet in two other cases, the appellate
division has ruled that plaintiffs' claims were not barred, despite
their signing of liability waivers. 94 In its determination of these
cases, the court did not articulate a public policy-based aversion
to waivers of liability, but rather found that the language of the
particular waivers failed to unequivocally express the intention
of the parties to relieve the defendant of liability as a result of
negligence. This indicates that New York may be more like Ohio
than Washington in evaluating the validity of releases of liability
for sports-related injuries.
V. PROPOSED APPROACH
In most every way, from age and experience to structure and
administration of the sport, there is a vast difference between
professional athletes and student athletes. 95  Given these
exempted the racetrack for liability for injuries "arising out of or related to the
EVENT(S)." Plaintiff was injured by falling bleachers, and it was argued that this
was not an "event" as defined. Id. at 369-70.
91 Id. ("In light of the plain language of the Agreement, the trial court did not
err in concluding that the Agreement barred Brent's negligence claim.").
92 Id. at 369 (citing Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206 (Me. 1979)).
93 See Tindall v. Ellenberg, 722 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 2001).
94 See Doe v. Archbishop Stepinac High Sch., 729 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539-40 (2d
Dep't 2001) (ruling that claim of a parochial high school student assaulted by
classmates on a school sponsored trip was not barred by a waiver); Machowski v.
Gallant, 651 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (4th Dep't 1996) (holding that claim of adult karate
student who suffered a heart attack while undertaking the test to receive a black
belt was not barred by a waiver).
95 Fundamentally, by the very nature of their status as professionals,
professional athletes have significantly more experience with the sport, a greater
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differences, it seems logical for New York to implement a
different analytical structure to evaluate the claims of these two
disparate groups. Specifically, the assumption of risk doctrine
should be allowed as a defense, complete or otherwise, only with
regard to professional athletes. The application of the
assumption of risk doctrine with regard to student athletes is
illogical, cumbersome, and unnecessarily harsh.
First, it is simply nonsensical to argue that a student who
fails to speak up when she is fatigued during a big game, or who
experiences a lapse in judgment and, for example, attempts a flip
without the proper mat beneath her, intended to assume the
risks of both her physical and legal injury.96 Additionally, the
New York courts' determination that schools at all times owe
their students a minimum duty of ordinary reasonable care, 97
coupled with their recasting of the assumption of risk doctrine as
the equivalent of finding an absence of any duty toward the
plaintiff,98 make it seemingly impossible to apply the assumption
understanding of the nature of the game, and, therefore, a substantially increased
subjective awareness of the risks involved. New York courts have recognized this
distinction by holding that a higher level of awareness of the risk is imputed to
professional athletes than to amateur athletes. See Maddox v. City of New York, 487
N.E.2d 553, 556-57 (N.Y. 1985); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Factually, professional sports have institutionalized methods of resolving
disputes and compensating athletes for injuries. These methods exist outside the
legal system and adequately serve the social objectives of tort law; there is no
analogue in scholastic athletics. See Sugarman, supra note 7, at 848 (discussing the
"elaborate structure" which exists in most professional sports to create rules and
deal with the issues of "deterrence, punishment and justice," which is enforced by
umpires, referees and the penalty structure both during the game and after it ends).
Further most professional athletes have access to insurance policies that may
compensate beyond what workers' compensation would provide, and which
"arguably, eclips[e] tort law's compensatory function." Id. Age is an important
distinction also, as adults can be held to a higher standard regarding both
knowledge of, and responsibility for, the consequences of their actions. Finally,
professional athletes are paid to assume, to some extent, the risks inherent in a
sport.
96 See Sugarman, supra note 7, at 877 ("Assumption of the physical risk is
essentially equated with assumption of the legal risk."); see also Fisher v. Syosset
Cent. Sch. Dist., 694 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (2d Dep't 1999) (affirming the dismissal of
complaint made by cheerleader injured during practice); Egger v. St. Dominic High
Sch., 657 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (2d Dep't 1997) (dismissing complaint of a wrestler injured
when practice was held on smaller than regulation-size mat); Clark v. Sachem Sch.
Dist., 641 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891 (2d Dep't 1996) (complaint of a swimmer injured during
a "false start" off diving blocks placed at the shallow end of the pool dismissed on
summary judgment basis).
97 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
98 See Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 208 (N.Y. 1997).
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of risk doctrine to student athletes participating in school sports.
Furthermore, application of the assumption of risk doctrine
to student injuries, especially in light of compulsion arguments, 99
is especially unfair because schools, school officials, and coaches
are in positions of authority. Although it rejected this argument,
the Court of Appeals did acknowledge that liability for
foreseeable risks may be imputed to a defendant (such as a
school district) when "an assurance of safety generally implicit in
the supervisor's direction supplants the plaintiffs assumption of
risk." 00 Yet this theory seems particularly appropriate in the
school context, where students may assume a certain degree of
safety if the program is run by the school, on school property,
and by personnel hired and paid for by the school. By
submitting to the authority of school officials, such as coaches
and administrators, students implicitly subordinate their
evaluation of the risks to those made by adult officials.
Application of the assumption of risk doctrine for injuries
resulting from school-related activities, therefore, holds students
liable for not knowing when to substitute their judgment for
their coaches' judgment.10 This is an unfair result and contrary
to one of the primary lessons to be learned by student athletes:
respect for rules and authority.
99 See Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1989). The
plaintiff argued, and the lower court agreed, that although the plaintiffs
participation in football was voluntary, the risk of injury was "unreasonably
enhanced by the 'indirect compulsion' of the teacher-student relationship." Id. at 32
(citation omitted). This argument was rejected by the majority on appeal. Id.; see
also supra note 45.
100 Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 33. The court noted that the second factor generally
necessary to sustain a finding of liability on an inherent compulsion theory is "'an
economic compulsion or other circumstance which equally impels' compliance with
the direction." Id. (quoting Verduce v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 192 N.Y.S.2d 913, 918
(1st Dep't 1959)). This factor, however, may have been present in Benitez's
situation, as well as that of other student athletes. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
101 See Daniel v. City of Morganton, 479 S.E.2d 263 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997). The
court dismissed on summary judgment the claim of a member of the softball team
who sustained injuries while practicing on a rough field still under construction,
despite the fact that it found one defendant, the coach, to be negligent in conducting
the practice there. The court relied on the fact that the student also knew it was
dangerous, and chose to remain. In doing so, the court failed to acknowledge any
compulsion on behalf of the coach that may have been felt by the student, and
required the student to substitute her judgment for the coach's in order to recover.
Id. at 267.
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The notion that participation in extracurricular sports is a
wholly voluntary endeavor is problematic as well. Many courts
and commentators have noted the importance of athletic
participation to students, 10 2 and for many, sports are an avenue
to higher education. 10 3 For these reasons, it seems inaccurate to
consider participation in school sports truly voluntary.
By omitting the confusing language and ideology of the
assumption of risk doctrine and analyzing the facts of these
cases under strict comparative fault principles, the proposed
approach implicitly takes these concerns into consideration. For
example, a jury apportioning fault between the plaintiff athlete
and defendant school district in Benitez would necessarily
consider that Benitez was a nineteen year old star athlete, who
had received numerous college scholarships for his abilities, and
that despite his intimate knowledge of football, he most likely
was under considerable pressure to maintain his standing and
opportunities and to continue to carry the team the way he had
in the past. 104
102 See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998) ("[Sports
activities] offer children the opportunity to learn valuable life skills. It is here that
many children learn how to work as a team and how to operate within an
organizational structure. Children also are given the chance to exercise and develop
coordination skills.").
103 See Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 33-34. Following its discussion of the inherent
compulsion theory, the court, in Benitez, noted that the plaintiff may have feared
that if he reported his fatigue or asked to be rested, then "his athletic standing or
scholarship opportunities might be jeopardized." Id. at 34. This is arguably a form of
the "economic compulsion" necessary to sustain a finding of liability despite the
foreseeability of the risk to the plaintiff.
Additionally, it has been found that in the "high-profile sports," such as football
and basketball, college games are a "national business," and that being an athlete
may improve an applicant's chances of admissions by up to fifty percent over non-
athletes with comparable grades and SAT scores. See Alan Ryan, Playing Go for
Broke with Their Eyes Shut, THE TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPPLEMENT, June 1, 2001,
at 27 (discussing JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE:
COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2001)). It is hard to argue that a high
school student, especially a gifted athlete, would not feel pressure to play beyond his
or her limits given such an advantage.
Further demonstrating the pressure on student athletes to compete, even before
getting to high school, is the noticeable trend of increased aggression among parent-
spectators occurring, in part, because the prospect of athletic scholarships has
"raised the ante" for participants. Jessica Garrison, Enforcing Etiquette on the
Sidelines, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, at 1.
104 See Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 31 ("Prior to his injury, he engaged, as was
customary for him, in the great majority of plays for his team's offensive, defensive
and special squads.").
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Likewise, in evaluating the defendant's share of the fault,
the jury would necessarily weigh the duty that schools generally
owe to students as established by judicial precedent, 105 as well as
the fact that, in this case, the coach had repeatedly tried to
exempt his team from the particular game in question because
he felt that the ability level between the two teams was
mismatched and presented a danger for his students; these
requests were denied by the principal of the school. 10 6 The coach
also testified that he knew his players were tired during the
game and that the risk of injury was heightened for this reason
as well. 10 7 A reasonable jury could conclude that, by nature of
his experience and ability, Benitez was indeed fully responsible
for the consequences of his actions. Or it could decide that the
district was, at least in part, responsible for this "luckless
accident."108 Alternatively, under a "pure" comparative fault
analysis, free from the complication of assumption of risk
doctrine, a jury would have its responsibility of apportioning
blame among the parties clearly defined. Moreover, such an
approach is eminently more compatible with the policy in New
York of imposing liability in proportion to responsibility.
In other cases, the proposed approach is likely to lead to the
same outcome as did the actual analysis. For example, in
Edelson v. Uniondale Union Free School District,10 9 the fact that
the plaintiff had three years of wrestling experience and was
informed prior to the match that his opponent was in a higher
classification could easily result in a finding that the plaintiff
was fully responsible for his injuries." 0 The facts of Traficenti v.
Moore Catholic High School"' provide an apt illustration of how
the proposed analysis may be less cumbersome. The Traficenti
court affirmed a denial of the school's summary judgment motion
because it found that the school's failure to supervise the
105 The Benitez court determined the standard to be that of "ordinary
reasonable care" in the context of intramural, interscholastic activities. Id. at 33.
106 Id.. at 31.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 34.
109 631 N.Y.S.2d 391 (2d Dep't 1995).
110 The court reversed the finding of the lower court, which denied defendant its
motion for summary judgment. The court found that "the plaintiff assumed the risk
of incurring the blow to the jaw ... [and hence, the] appellant did not breach its
duty of care." Id.
1 724 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1st Dep't 2001).
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students raised a triable issue as to whether the risk of injury
was increased and the supervisory duty breached. Yet the court
also determined that the plaintiff must be deemed to have freely
assumed the risk of performing a cheerleading stunt on a bare
hardwood floor.112 Under straight comparative fault analysis,
the trier of fact would view the circumstances as a whole, and
take into consideration both the plaintiffs irresponsibility in
performing a stunt without a mat and the defendant's
irresponsibility in leaving the minors unsupervised while
performing dangerous stunts. This analysis is simplified and
more likely to reach a rational conclusion.
Finally, because most of the reasons for abolishing the
assumption of risk doctrine as a defense in the school-sports
doctrine involve justifications peculiar to student athletes, and
because professionals are, and operate in, a context substantially
different from student athletes, the assumption of risk doctrine
should be maintained with regard to professionals. 113 By nature
of their status as professionals, these athletes are keenly aware
of the risks they are paid to undertake, thereby making the
determination of whether a particular athlete can be said to have
assumed a given risk much simpler than in the case of student
athletes. Further, as adults, professional athletes are better able
to bear the consequences of their decisions made during the
course of play and can more easily be said to have forgone their
legal rights by behaving negligently or irrationally. For these
reasons, the assumption of risk doctrine with regard to
professional athletes should be maintained so that these cases
may continue to be decided on a summary judgment basis,
thereby effectuating the interests of judicial efficiency. 114
112 See id. at 25.
113 As noted by the Turcotte court, "[A] professional clearly understands the
usual incidents of competition resulting from carelessness, particularly those which
result from the customarily accepted method of playing the sport, and accepts
them." Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 970 (N.Y. 1986).
114 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327-28 (1986). Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have authorized motions for summary judgment upon demonstration of a lack of a
triable issue of material fact. He stated that "[s]ummary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral
part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to 'secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action.' "Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
1). Additionally, summary judgment is the tool by which insufficient claims or
defenses are identified and kept from wasting public resources by going to trial. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Because of the confusion created by applying the assumption
of risk doctrine to principles of comparative fault, that doctrine
should play no role in considering claims brought by student
athletes. This is especially appropriate since assumption of risk
cannot readily be applied to students who have increased
pressure to defer to the judgment of their coaches and to
participate, no matter the cost. Nonetheless, both the difference
in circumstance and the interest in judicial expediency warrant
continued use of the assumption of risk doctrine with respect to
claims by professional athletes.
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